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Abstract
In the context of the two-stage threshold model of decision making,
with the agent’s choices determined by the interaction of three “struc-
tural variables,” we study the restrictions on behavior that arise when
one or more variables are exogenously known. Our results supply nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for consistency with the model for all
possible states of partial knowledge, and for both single- and multi-
valued choice functions.
1 Introduction
Recent work in the theory of individual choice behavior has modified the
classical preference maximization hypothesis in various ways. One approach
has been to weaken the consistency properties that preferences are ordinarily
assumed to possess.1 Another has been to study relationships between pref-
erence and choice other than straightforward maximization.2 And a third has
been to permit additional, non-preference-related factors—as well as multiple
preferences—to influence decision making in some way.3
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1For example, Eliaz and Ok [9], Mandler [14], Nishimura and Ok [23], and others allow
preferences to be incomplete, following in the tradition of Aumann [2] and Bewley [5].
2Models of this sort have been axiomatized by Baigent and Gaertner [3], Eliaz et al. [10],
Mariotti [19], and Tyson [30], among others.
3In addition to the contributions cited below, we have for example the work of Bossert
and Sprumont [6] and Masatlioglu and Ok [22] on status-quo bias; Ambrus and Rozen [1]
and Rubinstein and Salant [25] on multi-self and framing models; Caplin and Dean [7],
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In the context of this literature, the revealed preference exercise required
to characterize a given model can be quite challenging, since multiple factors
must often be inferred simultaneously from behavior. Moreover, models with
more than one component make possible a variant of the usual characteri-
zation problem: An outside observer can test a collection of choice data for
consistency with the model while treating one or more components as known.
For example, suppose that we postulate a decision maker who maximizes a
utility function over the alternatives that he or she notices, but pays attention
only to those options with a sufficiently high level of salience (with regard to
the visual or another sensory system). If salience is directly measurable, then
the relevant question is whether these measurements and the choice data to-
gether can be reconciled with our behavioral hypothesis.4 And this means, of
course, finding suitable assignments of the unobserved components—namely,
the utility function and the salience thresholds.
As another example, imagine a choice among lotteries by a satisficing
agent who decides between the options deemed satisfactory by following a
social-norm ordering. On the one hand, the social norm might be known to
the theorist, in which case it and the choice data must be jointly reconciled
with the model by specifying the utilities and satisficing thresholds. Alterna-
tively, perhaps the norm is unknown but we wish to introduce a maintained
assumption of risk neutrality. In the latter case our search will be for satis-
ficing thresholds (relative to expected value) plus a social norm that together
generate the observed behavior.
Evidently, questions of this sort can be posed for any multiple-component
model of choice, with any subset of the components taken to be known. In an
electoral setting we might plausibly know the economic interests of a voter
but not his or her ideology, while in a managerial setting we might assume
profit maximization subject to an unobserved market-share constraint. Note
that a model component could be designated as “known” due to an assump-
tion, a physical observation, econometric estimates from a separate data set,
or background knowledge of the agent’s environment, among other reasons.
In this paper we explore the issue of testing model consistency under par-
tial knowledge—one that appears to be largely unexamined within axiomatic
choice theory. To give this enterprise some concreteness, we shall commit to
a particular model of how choices are determined by the interaction of vari-
ous factors. We adopt a framework that is deliberately very general, and can
Cherepanov et al. [8], and Masatlioglu and Nakajima [20] on search and consideration sets;
and Mandler et al. [15], Manzini and Mariotti [17], and Bajraj and U¨lku¨ [4] on procedural
models.
4The observer might be able to determine salience levels, say, using knowledge of the
physiology of vision and the spatial arrangement of the choice alternatives.
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accommodate each of the above examples. For a given menu A of options,
the “two-stage threshold” (TST) model of choice specifies that the agent will
select an alternative that solves
max
x∈A
g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A). (1)
Here the model components, which we shall call “structural variables,” are
real-valued functions f and g defined on the space of alternatives, plus a
real-valued function θ defined on the space of menus.
The TST framework has no fixed interpretation. Indeed, the model over-
laps with several existing theories based on very different hypotheses about
the process of decision making. One possibility is to interpret f as a measure
of consideration or attention priority, θ as a cognition-threshold map, and g
as a utility function; as in the contributions of Lleras et al. [13] and Masatli-
oglu et al. [21].5 Another possibility is to interpret f as the utility function,
θ as a utility-threshold map, and g as a salience measure; as in Tyson [31].
Under these two interpretations the first stage of the model captures, respec-
tively, the “consideration set” (a concept from the marketing literature) and
Simon’s [27] notion of satisficing.6
In its general form the TST model has been characterized by Manzini et
al. [18], who demonstrate that Equation 1 can accommodate a wide range of
behavior patterns. Indeed, when each set of acceptable choices is required
to be a singleton, it is straightforward to show that any observed data set
can be generated by the model (see Proposition 2.6). Moreover, even if we
allow multiple acceptable choices, the constraints imposed by the framework
itself remain conspicuously weak (see Theorem 2.5). While the theories men-
tioned above reduce this freedom by imposing specialized restrictions on the
structural variables, our approach at present is to fix one or more variables
completely and leave the others entirely unconstrained.7 We then seek to
identify the forms of behavior that remain consistent with the model.
Given a particular interpretation of the model, some structural variables
will be more naturally assumed to be known than others. Since our intention
is to avoid favoring any specific viewpoint, we provide a complete and hence
interpretation-free collection of characterization results: For any strict subset
of the three structural variables, we supply necessary and sufficient conditions
for behavior to be compatible with the TST model when the variables in the
5Related models are studied by Eliaz and Spiegler [11] and Spears [28].
6For further details of these interpretations of the TST framework, see [18, pp. 879–881].
7These two approaches can also be combined. For instance, Theorem 3.12 below can be
modified to incorporate the “expansiveness” restriction on 〈f, θ〉 imposed by Tyson [31].
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subset are known and all others are unrestricted.8 This collection of results—
together with posing the partial knowledge question for multiple-component
choice models—makes up the contribution of the paper.
Broadly speaking, our analytical method is to use the choice data together
with the known variables to infer as much information as we can about the
unobserved variables. We then look for ways in which this information could
be self-contradictory, and formulate axioms that rule them out. Such axioms
will always be necessary for behavior to be compatible with the model. And
if our search for contradictions is thorough enough, they will also be sufficient
(though demonstrating this may require extended arguments).
For example, suppose that g is known while both f and θ are unobserved
(cf. Theorem 3.12). If alternatives x and y are both on menu A, and if also
g(x) > g(y), then clearly x and y cannot both be chosen from A. This is
the simplest illustration of how choice data and a known structural variable
together can lead to a contradiction, which must be ruled out axiomatically.
Suppose now that f and g are both known, with only θ unobserved
(cf. Theorem 3.18). Since g is known, the variety of contradiction seen in
the preceding paragraph must still be avoided. Furthermore, if alternatives
x and y are both on menu A, and if also f(x) ≥ f(y) and g(x) ≥ g(y), then
we cannot have that y is chosen from A unless x too is chosen. These two
types of contradictions turn out to exhaust the implications of the model
when both f and g are known, which is to say that axioms ruling them out
provide the desired characterization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the
TST framework and reviews the axiomatization of the unconstrained model
given by Manzini et al. [18]. Our novel results are stated first in Section 3
for multi-valued choice functions, and then in Section 4 for the single-valued
special case. Section 5 contains a brief concluding discussion. Proofs of the
general (multi-valued) versions of our results can be found in the Appendix.
8We assume that knowledge of one structural variable has no direct implications for
the unknown variables, which can be chosen arbitrarily to generate the observed behavior.
This assumption will not hold under interpretations of the model that motivate joint
restrictions on the variables. For example, in [31] the functions f and θ are linked by
the property of “expansiveness.” It is even possible that knowledge of one variable could
completely determine another, for instance if θ(A) equals the average |A|−1∑x∈A f(x) of
the available f -values. Dependencies like these could certainly be taken into account in
the characterization exercises we carry out, but we shall not impose any such link between
structural variables as a blanket restriction on the model.
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2 The two-stage threshold model
Let X be a nonempty, finite set, and let D ⊆ A = 2X \ {∅}. The elements of
X are called alternatives, the elements of D are called menus, and any map
C : D → A such that ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) ⊆ A is called a choice function.
The choice set C(A) contains the alternatives that are chosen from menu
A. A choice function is single-valued if it returns only singleton choice sets.
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that ∀x ∈ X we have {x} ∈ D.
In the TST model, the choice set associated with menu A is constructed
by maximizing g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A). Here f : X → < is the primary
criterion, g : X → < the secondary criterion, and θ : D → < the threshold
map. These three components of the model are termed structural variables,
any triple 〈f, θ, g〉 is a profile, and any pair 〈f, θ〉 is a primary profile.
Given a primary profile 〈f, θ〉 and an A ∈ D, write Γ(A|f, θ) = {x ∈ A :
f(x) ≥ θ(A)} for the subset of available alternatives whose primary criterion
values are above the relevant threshold. The TST model can now be defined
formally as follows.
2.1 Definition. A two-stage threshold representation of C is a profile 〈f, θ, g〉
such that ∀A ∈ D we have C(A) = argmaxx∈Γ(A|f,θ) g(x).
In order to axiomatize this model, Manzini et al. [18] use several binary
relations that are revealed by the agent’s choices. The separation relation
encodes situations where one alternative is chosen and a second (available)
alternative is rejected.
2.2 Definition. Let xSy if ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A).
The togetherness relation encodes situations where two alternatives both are
chosen, and its transitive closure is the extended togetherness relation.9
2.3 Definition. Let xTy if ∃A ∈ D such that x, y ∈ C(A), and let xEy if
∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Tz2T · · ·Tzn = y.
Finally, the first-stage separation relation encodes separations that must be
attributed to the primary criterion, since an extended togetherness relation-
ship guarantees equal values of the secondary criterion.10
2.4 Definition. Let xFy if xEy and xSy.
9Recall that a relation R is transitive if xRyRz ⇒ xRz, and that the transitive closure
of R is the smallest transitive relation containing it.
10More explicitly, if xEy then x = z1Tz2T · · ·Tzn = y, which under the TST model
implies that g(x) = g(z1) = g(z2) = · · · = g(zn) = g(y) for some z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X. If also
xSy, then under the model we must have f(x) ≥ θ(A) > f(y) for some A ∈ D.
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Manzini et al. [18, pp. 876–879] prove that acyclicity of this last relation
is the one and only condition needed to characterize the TST model in the
absence of known structural variables.11
2.5 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation if
and only if the relation F is acyclic.
Moreover, since the relations T , E, and F are all empty in the single-valued
case, here the acyclicity condition holds trivially and so consistency with the
model is assured.
2.6 Proposition. Any single-valued choice function has a two-stage thresh-
old representation.
3 Characterization results
3.1 One known structural variable
We consider first situations where exactly one of the three structural variables
is known. As explained in Section 1, our method is to search for information
about the unknown variables that is revealed by the choice data together with
the known variable. We then construct axioms that prevent contradictions,
which will yield the desired characterization once all possible contradictions
have been identified and ruled out.
Known primary criterion. Suppose that the primary criterion f is known,
while the threshold map θ and secondary criterion g are not, and let x, y ∈ A.
In this case knowledge that f(y) ≥ f(x) implies that y survives the first stage
of choice from A if x does so; i.e., that x ∈ Γ(A|f, θ) ⇒ y ∈ Γ(A|f, θ). But
then from the observation xSy we can deduce that g(x) > g(y), since x can
only have been separated from y at the second stage. In other words, second-
stage superiority of one alternative over another is revealed by the relation
defined as follows in terms of the known f and the observed C.
3.1 Definition. Let xHfy if f(y) ≥ f(x) and xSy.
Since Hf implies strict second-stage superiority between alternatives, this
relation must be acyclic for the model to hold. That is to say, acyclicity of Hf
is necessary for C to admit a TST representation consistent with the partial
profile 〈f, ·, ·〉.
11Recall that a relation R is acyclic if x1Rx2R · · ·Rxn ⇒ x1 6= xn.
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3.2 Example. Let f(x) = f(y) = 1, C(xy) = x, and C(xyz) = y. If 〈f, θ, g〉
were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x) and C(xy) = x together
would imply g(x) > g(y), but at the same time f(x) ≥ f(y) and C(xyz) = y
would imply g(y) > g(x), a contradiction.
While Hf reveals second-stage superiority, the extended togetherness re-
lation E reveals second-stage indifference (see Footnote 10). Choice data can
thus be incompatible with the TST model even in the absence of an Hf -cycle,
as seen in the following example.
3.3 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 2, f(z) = 0, C(xy) = x, C(xz) = z, and
C(yz) = yz. If 〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x)
and C(xy) = x together would imply g(x) > g(y), and likewise f(x) ≥ f(z)
and C(xz) = z would imply g(z) > g(x). But then C(yz) = yz would imply
g(y) = g(z) > g(x) > g(y), a contradiction.
The choice function in the latter example has the relation F empty (and
therefore vacuously acyclic), so there is no difficulty in exhibiting a TST
representation when all three structural variables are free. It is only in com-
bination with the specified f that the data in C conflict with the model, due
to the mixed cycle zHfxHfyEz.
With such situations in mind, we define formally the relationship of being
linked by a chain of alternatives connected sequentially by either Hf or E.
3.4 Definition. Let xWfy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHfzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
This relation reveals weak second-stage superiority, and strict superiority if
at least one link in the chain is via Hf . The condition needed for a character-
ization, analogous to Richter’s [24, p. 637] Congruence axiom, is then that
no alternative bear Wf to itself except via extended togetherness.
3.5 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, ·, ·〉 if and only if xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx].
Known threshold map. Now suppose instead that the threshold map θ is the
known structural variable. In this situation, if we can identify A,B ∈ D and
y ∈ A ∩ B such that both y ∈ C(B) and θ(B) ≥ θ(A), then clearly we can
conclude that f(y) ≥ θ(A). If moreover both x ∈ C(A) and y /∈ C(A), then
y must have been eliminated from A at the second stage and hence we must
have g(x) > g(y).
To capture this method of deducing second-stage superiority from the
known θ and observed C, we define the critical threshold for alternative y.
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3.6 Definition. Let M(y|θ) = max{θ(A) : A ∈ D ∧ y ∈ C(A)}.
In other words, the critical threshold is the highest threshold of any menu to
whose choice set the alternative belongs, with the obvious consequence that
y ∈ C(A) only if M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A).12 The above logic is then expressed in the
construction of the following revealed relation.
3.7 Definition. Let xHθy if ∃A ∈ D such that M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A),
and y ∈ A \ C(A).
As before, we can use the strict second-stage relation Hθ to define a weak
counterpart.
3.8 Definition. Let xWθy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHθzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
And our characterization result then once again uses a congruence condition
to identify the data sets consistent with the model.
3.9 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, θ, ·〉 if and only if xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx].
Known secondary criterion. If the known structural variable is the secondary
criterion g, then the following relation—defined analogously with Hf above—
will reveal strict first-stage superiority.
3.10 Definition. Let xHgy if both g(y) ≥ g(x) and xSy.
This new relation must clearly be acyclic. But since it pertains to the first
stage, combining it with extended togetherness (as in the construction of Wf
and Wθ) is unhelpful. Instead, we need to check that revealed second-stage
indifference agrees with the observed secondary criterion, which is to say that
alternatives related by E have identical g-values.
3.11 Example. Let g(x) = 1, g(y) = 2, C(xz) = xz, and C(xyz) = yz. If
〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then C(xz) = xz would imply that
g(x) = g(z), while C(xyz) = yz would imply that g(z) = g(y). But then we
would have g(x) = g(y), which is false.
3.12 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉 if and only if Hg is acyclic and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y).
12Note that since for each y ∈ X we have {y} ∈ D and y ∈ C({y}), and since D is a
finite set, the critical threshold is always well defined.
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3.2 Two known structural variables
Next we consider situations where exactly two structural variables are known.
Known primary profile. When the full primary profile 〈f, θ〉 is known, it is
possible for this information to contradict the choice function directly, in a
way that has nothing to do with inferences about the second stage.
3.13 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 3, θ(xyz) = 2, and C(xyz) = x. If
〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then x ∈ C(xyz) would imply that
f(x) ≥ θ(xyz), which is false.
To avoid such contradictions, our first necessary condition says simply that
for each x ∈ C(A) we have f(x) ≥ θ(A); abbreviated as f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
With the primary criterion known, the statement M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A) in the
definition of Hθ (guaranteeing that y will survive the first stage of choice from
menu A) can be replaced with an explicit assumption that f(y) ≥ θ(A). This
modification leads to the following relation, which continues to reveal strict
second-stage superiority.
3.14 Definition. Let xHfθy if ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A),
and y ∈ A \ C(A).
The weak counterpart to this relation is defined in the usual way.
3.15 Definition. Let xWfθy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that z1 = x, zn = y,
and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we have either zkHfθzk+1 or zkEzk+1.
And the resulting congruence axiom then completes our characterization for
the present case.13
3.16 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 if and only if xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
Known primary and secondary criteria. Now suppose that both f and g are
known, but θ is unobserved. Here xHfy continues to imply that g(x) > g(y).
But rather than merely being checked for cycles and contradictions with the
choice function, as in Theorem 3.5, inequalities of this sort can now be tested
directly against the known g.
13Unlike Theorems 3.5 and 3.9, Theorem 3.16 can be viewed as a direct consequence of
Richter’s [24] classical axiomatization. This is because when the entire primary profile is
observable, the subsets Γ(A|f, θ) of alternatives that survive the first stage are themselves
observable. Provided f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A), these survivor subsets can be treated as surrogate
menus, and the TST characterization problem reduces to the classical revealed-preference
exercise considered by Richter.
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3.17 Example. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 2, g(x) = g(y) = 0, and C(xy) = x.
If 〈f, θ, g〉 were a TST representation of C, then f(y) ≥ f(x) and C(xy) = x
together would imply g(x) > g(y), which is false.
Moreover, since the secondary criterion is known, the condition that options
related by E have identical g-values (used in Theorem 3.12) remains necessary
for a TST representation. Together, these two consistency tests supply the
desired characterization.
3.18 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 if and only if xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y).
Known threshold map and secondary criterion. If instead θ and g are known,
but not f , then we must substitute Hθ for Hf as our indicator of second-stage
superiority. With this modification, our search for contradictions proceeds
just as in the previous case, yielding the following result.
3.19 Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation
consistent with 〈·, θ, g〉 if and only if xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y).
4 Single-valued choice functions
In this section we specialize our results to the context of single-valued choice
functions. This restriction simplifies our characterizations, albeit at the cost
of substantial generality.
To understand the impact of the single-valuedness restriction, it is useful
to partition our results into two groups: those where the secondary criterion
is known, and those where it is unknown. Within the first group, each of the
three axiomatizations (namely, Theorems 3.12, 3.18, and 3.19) involves the
condition that xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y). But since the relation E is always empty
for single-valued C, this condition now holds vacuously and can be deleted.
Our simplified characterizations then appear as follows.
4.1 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉 if and only if Hg is acyclic.
4.2 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 if and only if xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
4.3 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, θ, g〉 if and only if xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
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Now consider the second group of results, with g unknown. Each of these
axiomatizations (namely, Theorems 3.5, 3.9, and 3.16) involves a congruence
condition stating that an alternative can be revealed weakly second-stage
superior to itself only via the extended togetherness relation. But again,
the relation E is always empty in the single-valued case, so our congruence
conditions each reduce to acyclicity of the relevant notion of strict second-
stage superiority. We thus obtain the following simplified characterizations.
4.4 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈f, ·, ·〉 if and only if Hf is acyclic.
4.5 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold
representation consistent with 〈·, θ, ·〉 if and only if Hθ is acyclic.
4.6 Proposition. A single-valued choice function has a two-stage thresh-
old representation consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 if and only if Hfθ is acyclic and
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
Under the restriction to single-valued choice functions, we find that the
TST model with one known structural variable is characterized in each case
by a simple acyclicity condition (Propositions 4.1, 4.4, and 4.5). If either of
the first-stage variables is known, then adding knowledge of the secondary cri-
terion leads to replacing the acyclicity requirement with a test of consistency
between revealed and observed second-stage superiority (Propositions 4.2
and 4.3). On the other hand, adding knowledge of the remaining first-stage
variable requires both strengthening the acyclicity condition and checking
compatibility of choices with the observed primary profile (Proposition 4.6).
5 Discussion
5.1 Summary of results
Our axiomatizations of the TST model with partial knowledge are summa-
rized in Figure 1 for multi-valued choice functions and in Figure 2 under
the single-valuedness restriction. These figures also show the logical relation-
ships among the various results. For example, starting from Theorem 3.18
(resp., Proposition 4.2), we can discard our knowledge of the secondary cri-
terion and thereby arrive at Theorem 3.5 (resp., Proposition 4.4). Hence any
choice data permitted by the former result must be permitted by the latter,
as well as by Theorem 3.12 (resp., Proposition 4.1) since we can equally well
discard our knowledge of the primary criterion. Moreover, we have already
seen in Section 4 how each single-valued characterization is a corollary of the
corresponding multi-valued result.
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Thm 2.5: 〈·, ·, ·〉 iff
F acyclic
?? ?
Thm 3.12: 〈·, ·, g〉 iff
Hg acyclic,
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 3.5: 〈f, ·, ·〉 iff
xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx]
Thm 3.9: 〈·, θ, ·〉 iff
xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]
Thm 3.18: 〈f, ·, g〉 iff
xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y),
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 3.19: 〈·, θ, g〉 iff
xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y),
xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y)
Thm 3.16: 〈f, θ, ·〉 iff
xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx],
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A)
? ? ??? ?
Figure 1: Summary of characterization results for multi-valued choice.
Prop. 2.6: 〈·, ·, ·〉 iff
—
?? ?
Prop. 4.1: 〈·, ·, g〉 iff
Hg acyclic
Prop. 4.4: 〈f, ·, ·〉 iff
Hf acyclic
Prop. 4.5: 〈·, θ, ·〉 iff
Hθ acyclic
Prop. 4.2: 〈f, ·, g〉 iff
xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y)
Prop. 4.3: 〈·, θ, g〉 iff
xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y)
Prop. 4.6: 〈f, θ, ·〉 iff
Hfθ acyclic,
f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A)
? ? ??? ?
Figure 2: Summary of characterization results for single-valued choice.
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5.2 Partial knowledge in other settings
In addition to establishing the specific results shown in Figures 1–2, a further
goal of this paper has been to introduce the issue of partial knowledge itself.
Beyond the TST context, partial-knowledge characterizations can be sought
for other models of choice that make use of multiple “structural variables”
in the sense of distinguishable cognitive components. For models that have
features in common with the present framework—such as threshold effects
or sequentially applied criteria—it may be hoped that our techniques will be
transferable to some degree.
For instance, consider the following variant of the “rational shortlist
method” (RSM) model proposed by Manzini and Mariotti [16]. In the first
of two stages, the decision maker eliminates any alternative that is not max-
imal with respect to an asymmetric binary relation .14 Then, in the second
stage, a criterion function g is optimized in the usual way. Since maximiza-
tion over menu A of an asymmetric  cannot in general be represented with
a threshold structure Γ(A|f, θ), this model is not covered by the TST frame-
work. Moreover, since optimization of a secondary criterion is stronger than
the second-stage procedure specified by Manzini and Mariotti, the new model
is a special case of an RSM.
This model would impose constraints on the decision maker’s behavior
under either single- or multi-valued choice.15 Furthermore, we might wonder
what additional restrictions are implied by knowledge of either the relation 
or the criterion g. Assuming a known  would lead to a situation similar to
that in Theorem 3.16, whose proof can be suitably modified (see Footnote 13).
Alternatively, assuming a known g would lead to a situation resembling that
in Theorem 3.12, and one that poses more of a challenge. Here the objective
would be to use the known g and the observed C to infer information about
the unknown , devising axioms that rule out all possible contradictions.16
Partial knowledge could also be introduced in the setting of Salant and
Rubinstein’s [26] “salient consideration functions.” Here choice sets have the
structure C(A) =
⋃n
i=1{x ∈ A : ∀y ∈ A ¬[yPix]}, where n is an integer and
each Pi a relation. Apart from the constraints intrinsic to this model, we
can ask what additional restrictions are implied by knowledge of n, or of one
or more Pi relations. And similar questions can be posed in the context of
Kalai et al.’s [12] “rationalization by multiple rationales,” another prominent
multiple-factor model of choice.
14Recall that a relation R is asymmetric if xRy ⇒ ¬[yRx].
15Indeed, such constraints are implied by the general characterization of RSMs in [16].
16As a first step towards such an axiomatization, observe that if x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A\C(A),
and g(y) ≥ g(x), then for any B ⊇ A we cannot have y ∈ C(B).
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A Appendix
As depicted in Figures 1–2, results for TST representations with more known
variables can be used to help prove results with less known variables. For
example, to demonstrate that the conditions in Theorem 3.12 are sufficient
for a representation consistent with 〈·, ·, g〉, it is enough to define a primary
criterion f such that the conditions in Theorem 3.18 hold.
We shall make extensive use of this proof strategy, and so to preserve log-
ical continuity we shall prove our results non-consecutively. Specifically, we
prove first Theorem 3.18, followed by Theorems 3.5 and 3.12. We then prove
Theorem 3.16, followed by Theorem 3.9. And lastly we prove Theorem 3.19.
A few items of notation not employed in the main text will be used in the
proofs: We write xR∗y if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Rz2R · · ·Rzn =
y (thereby defining the transitive closure R∗ of the relation R). Furthermore,
we write K(x) for the E-equivalence class of x ∈ X, and K = {K(x) : x ∈ X}
for the associated partition of X.17
Proof of Theorem 3.18. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, where-
upon the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. For x, y ∈ X, if xHfy
then f(y) ≥ f(x) and xSy. Hence ∃A ∈ D with x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A\C(A),
so that f(y) ≥ f(x) ≥ θ(A) and g(x) > g(y). Thus xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
Conversely, suppose that both xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y). Given A ∈ D, let θ(A) = minx∈C(A) f(x), so that for each x ∈ C(A)
we have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any y ∈ C(A) we have xTy, xEy, and
g(x) = g(y). Now let w ∈ C(A) be such that f(w) = θ(A). If ∃z ∈ A \C(A)
with f(z) ≥ θ(A), then both wSz and f(z) ≥ θ(A) = f(w). But then wHfz
and so g(w) > g(z). It follows that 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C. We then
have xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) by Theorem 3.18, and it
follows that xWfy ⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y)⇒ ¬[yHfx].
Conversely, suppose that xWfy ⇒ ¬[yHfx]. ForK1, K2 ∈ K, letK1  K2
if there exist x1 ∈ K1 and x2 ∈ K2 such that x1Hfx2.
A.1 Lemma.  is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose instead that ∃K1, K2, . . . , Kn ∈ K with K1  K2  · · · 
Kn  K1. For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} there must exist xk, yk ∈ Kk such that
17Recall that a binary relation is an equivalence if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transi-
tive. (Reflexivity ofR means that xRx, and symmetry means that xRy ⇒ yRx.) Extended
togetherness inherits the properties of reflexivity and symmetry from togetherness, and is
transitive by construction.
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x1Hfy2Ex2Hfy3E · · ·HfynExnHfy1Ex1. But then both y2Wfx1 and x1Hfy2,
contradicting y2Wfx1 ⇒ ¬[x1Hfy2].
Since  is acyclic, ∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a linear order≫ such that ∀K1, K2 ∈ K we have
K1  K2 ⇒ K1≫ K2. Now let xQy if K(x)≫ K(y), so that Q is a weak
order, and take any numerical representation g of Q.18
For x, y ∈ X we have xEy only if K(x) = K(y) and g(x) = g(y). More-
over, xHfy only if K(x) K(y), K(x)≫ K(y), and g(x) > g(y). But then
C has a TST representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 by Theorem 3.18.
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, where-
upon the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. Moreover, for
x, y ∈ X we have xHfy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) by Theorem 3.18, which is logi-
cally equivalent to xHgy ⇒ f(x) > f(y). But then Hg is acyclic.
Conversely, suppose that both Hg is acyclic and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y). Let
xQy if g(y) > g(x) or xHgy, so that ∀w, z ∈ X we have wQ∗z ⇒ g(z) ≥ g(w).
A.2 Lemma. Q is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose instead that ∃x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X such that x1Qx2Q · · ·Qxn =
x1. Since Hg is acyclic, there must exist a k < n such that g(xk+1) > g(xk).
But since xk+1Q
∗xk we have also g(xk) ≥ g(xk+1), a contradiction.
Since Q is acyclic, Q∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a weak order P such that ∀x, y ∈ X we have
xQ∗y ⇒ xPy. Let f be any numerical representation of P .
For x, y ∈ X we now have xHfy only if xSy and f(y) ≥ f(x); and thus
only if ¬[xPy], ¬[xQ∗y], ¬[xQy], and g(x) > g(y). But then C has a TST
representation consistent with 〈f, ·, g〉 by Theorem 3.18.
Proof of Theorem 3.16. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, where-
upon the implications x ∈ C(A)⇒ f(x) ≥ θ(A) and xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) are
both immediate. For x, y ∈ X, if xHfθy then ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥ θ(A),
x ∈ C(A), and y ∈ A \C(A), which implies g(x) > g(y). And it follows that
xWfθy ⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y)⇒ ¬[yHfθx].
Conversely, suppose that both xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A).
For K1, K2 ∈ K, let K1  K2 if there exist x1 ∈ K1 and x2 ∈ K2 such that
x1Hfθx2.
18Recall that a binary relation is a strict partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive; a
weak order if it is a strict partial order that is negatively transitive; and a linear order if it
is a weak order that is weakly complete. (Irreflexivity of R means that ¬[xRx]; negative
transitivity means that [¬[xRy] ∧ ¬[yRz]] ⇒ ¬[xRz]; and weak completeness means that
[¬[xRy] ∧ ¬[yRx]]⇒ x = y.)
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A.3 Lemma.  is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose instead that ∃K1, K2, . . . , Kn ∈ K with K1  K2  · · · 
Kn  K1. For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} there must exist xk, yk ∈ Kk such
that x1Hfθy2Ex2Hfθy3E · · ·HfθynExnHfθy1Ex1. But then both y2Wfθx1 and
x1Hfθy2, contradicting y2Wfθx1 ⇒ ¬[x1Hfθy2].
Since  is acyclic, ∗ is a strict partial order. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem [29],
it follows that there exists a linear order≫ such that ∀K1, K2 ∈ K we have
K1  K2 ⇒ K1≫ K2. Now let xQy if K(x)≫ K(y), so that Q is a weak
order, and take any numerical representation g of Q.
For x, y ∈ X we have xEy only if K(x) = K(y) and g(x) = g(y). More-
over, we have xHfθy only if K(x) K(y), K(x)≫ K(y), and g(x) > g(y).
Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any
y ∈ C(A), we have xTy, xEy, and g(x) = g(y). If there exists a z ∈ A\C(A)
with f(z) ≥ θ(A), then we have xHfθz and so g(x) > g(z). It follows that
〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C. We then
have xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx] and f [C(A)] ≥ θ(A) by Theorem 3.16. It follows
that ∀x ∈ X we have f(x) ≥M(x|θ). Moreover, for x, y ∈ X we have xHθy
only if ∃A ∈ D such that f(y) ≥M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A), and y ∈ A\C(A),
which implies xHfθy. Hence xWθy ⇒ xWfθy ⇒ ¬[yHfθx]⇒ ¬[yHθx].
Conversely, suppose that xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]. For each x ∈ X, let f(x) =
M(x|θ). Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we then have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover,
for each x, y ∈ X we have xHθy ⇐⇒ xHfθy and hence xWθy ⇐⇒ xWfθy.
But then we can conclude that xWfθy ⇒ xWθy ⇒ ¬[yHθx]⇒ ¬[yHfθx], and
so C has a TST representation consistent with 〈f, θ, ·〉 by Theorem 3.16.
Proof of Theorem 3.19. Let 〈f, θ, g〉 be a TST representation of C, where-
upon the implication xEy ⇒ g(x) = g(y) is immediate. Moreover, for
x, y ∈ X we have xHθy only if ∃A ∈ D with M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), x ∈ C(A), and
y ∈ A \ C(A). Now let B ∈ D be such that y ∈ C(B) and M(y|θ) = θ(B).
It follows that f(y) ≥ θ(B) = M(y|θ) ≥ θ(A), and so g(x) > g(y). Thus
xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y).
Conversely, suppose that both xHθy ⇒ g(x) > g(y) and xEy ⇒ g(x) =
g(y). For each x ∈ X, let f(x) = M(x|θ). Given A ∈ D and x ∈ C(A), we
then have f(x) ≥ θ(A). Moreover, for any y ∈ C(A) we have xTy, xEy, and
g(x) = g(y). If ∃z ∈ A \ C(A) with θ(A) ≤ f(z) = M(z|θ), then xHθz and
so g(x) > g(z). It follows that 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
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